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STRIKES AND PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT
Theodore W. Kheel*
of the major unmet challenges we face is how to prevent
strikes by public employees without denying them the right
to organize and bargain collectively. Public employment grows in
significance each day as governments at every level undertake new
programs to supply additional services for the public good. Across
the nation there are some twelve million public workers, twice the
number there were in 1950.1 More than 8.5 million of these public
employees work for state and local government; 2 it is anticipated
that their number will grow by two thirds in the next decade. Of
2.8 million federal workers, more than one million are union members.3 It is estimated that ninety-nine per cent of American cities
with a population over 250,000 have unions or employee associations
representing public workers. Labor Depattment statistics for 1969
showed 629,000 state and local employees in AFL-CIO affiliates, and
independent teachers' organizations report membership of 1,168,000.4 The fastest growing labor organization in the country is the
American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees,
AFL-CIO.15
This tendency of public employees to organize has been aided by
legislation facilitating union recognition and imposing obligations
on public employers to negotiate with employee representatives. 6
The spread of organization among public employees is also a reflection of a more general tendency in our society to form groups in
order to augment the force of individual demands by concerted action. Students, black Americans, football players, tenants, and welfare recipients, among others, have joined together in pursuit of
shared aims. Organization quite naturally produces greater demands
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1. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STA·
TISTICS 1968, at 80, table 41 (1968).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 296, table 126.
4. Id.
5. Ross, Those Newly Militant Government Workers, FORTUNE, Aug. 1968, at 104.
6. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153(d) (Supp. 1969); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.
§ 423.209 (1967); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l to -13 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. CIV. SERv. I.Aw
§§ 200-12, (McKinney Supp. 1968) [The present version of this law, as amended by a
bill passed March 4, 1969 (effective April I, 1969), appears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE
RELATIONS REPORT, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).]; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2)
(Supp. 1969). See Report of the Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employer
Law of Pennsylvania (June 1968).
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and often some form of action to support those demands. This, too,
is not unique to labor organizations. Politicians and commentators
speak of a new militancy and point to more strident demands and
direct action by all sorts of groups.
In public employment there has been an increasing resort to
strikes in all parts of the nation by employees previously immuneteachers, policemen, firemen, welfare workers, garbage collectors,
hospital attendants, doctors, nurses, and zoo keepers. The strike
fever is contagious, and leapfrogging demands and multiplying disputes leave government hesitant, defensive, and distracted from the
unresolved problems of our urban crisis. The basic question-and
the great challenge-is how to prevent strikes that imperil the public interest while still providing millions of public employees with
the opportunity to participate in the process of determining the conditions of their work, an opportunity not only guaranteed employees
in the private sector but also accepted as socially beneficial.
The common answer to this question in public employment was
to prohibit all strikes by statute or court decision7 and to prescribe
penalties in the form of fines or imprisonment, or both, for violation
of these prohibitions. Employees were allowed to negotiate with
their employers through unions, but they were required to accept
as final the decision of the legislative or executive body with authority to set terms of employment. Any further change had to be
sought by lobbying or through the polls.
This was the pattern in New York under the Condon-Wadlin
Law.8 It was not successful. The legal prohibition of strikes did not
prevent workers from threatening disruptions of service and, on
occasion, from carrying out the threat. The penalties assessed against
individual workers did not deter them from concerted action. 9 After
a twelve-day transit strike in 1966 that nearly brought New York
City to a complete standstill,10 the need for change was apparent.
7. See Annot., Union Organization and Activities of Public Employees, 31 A.L.R.2d
1142, 1159-61 (1953). For a more recent view, see School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn.,
380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968). See also Smith, State and Local Advisory Reports
on Public Employment Labor Legislation: A. Comparative Analysis, 67 MICH. L. REv.
891, 892, 898 (1969)
8. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of April
23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967).
9. Under the provisions of this act, the striking employee was subject to im•
mediate dismissal. The employee could be reinstated only on condition that he remain
on probation for five years and his compensation was to remain fixed for a period of
three years. However, these sanctions were found to be largely unenforceable and,
thus, were seldom invoked.
10. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1966, at 1.
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Not only had the law failed to stop the strike, but it threatened to
produce a second work stoppage because of the penalty provisions.
The enforcement of these provisions would have denied the transit
workers the higher wages and other benefits negotiated under the
mayor's auspices. As a result, the governor and the legislature concluded that there was no alternative but to waive the penalties
despite the clear violations of the statue. The law was in disrepute.
Governor Rockefeller convened a special committee headed by Dr.
George W. Taylor, one of America's greatest authorities on industrial relations. The report of this committee was substantially incorporated in a piece of new legislation, although with one important
qualification which will be discussed below. The Taylor Law continued the absolute prohibition on strikes by public employees,11
while shifting penalties so that they would be directed primarily
against the employee organization rather than the individual
worker.12 In addition, it assured rights of organization, imposed an
obligation on public employees to meet and confer with employer
representatives, and established an elaborate machinery of thirdparty recommendations to aid the parties in the "collective negotiations"13 that were expected to produce agreements.
The penalties flowed necessarily from the strike ban. Once a form
of conduct is made illegal, a system of penalties for violations must
also be prescribed. In the case of unions, this is not without its difficulties. Who is to blame when a strike occurs? Is it the leaders of
the union, the union itself, or the members who actually strike? Condon-Wadlin implied that it was the strikers, since it prohibited them
from receiving wage increases for a specified period of time. 14 The
Taylor Law shifted the burden to the union and its leaders, undoubtedly because of the widespread belief that during the transit
11. The Taylor Law is incorporated in N.Y. CIV. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney
Supp. 1968). [The present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March
4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), appears in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT,
No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).] The strike prohibition is contained in section 200.
12. The New York Legislature amended the Taylor Law on March 4, 1969, to
provide for stiffer penalties against striking public employers and their unions. The
amendments call for unlimited fines against striking unions and the loss of dues
check-off privileges for unlimited periods. Another section provides for the loss of two
days' pay for each day a public employee is on strike. Moreover, a striking worker is
subject to one year's prohibition with loss of tenure for any violation of the strike
prohibition. For the text of the law as amended, see GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS
REPORT, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969) (hereinafter GERR].
I!!. The Taylor Law uses the term "collective negotiations" instead of "collective
bargaining," because the latter phrase implies the possibility of a strike. And, according to the Taylor Law, strikes are illegal.
14. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 104(5)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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strike the union's leadership had induced the workers to strike. But
the current wave of rank-and-file rejections of negotiated settlements15 casts a serious doubt on the validity of this underlying assumption in the penalty provisions of the Taylor Law.
In addition to a schedule of penalties, a law granting public employees the right to negotiate must also contain a strike substitute
to resolve any impasse in negotiations. The Taylor Law calls for
the appointment of a board to make recommendations for a settle. ment.16 But recommendations by definition can be rejected. The
framers of the Taylor Law apparently assumed that the unions would
be the only ones to reject recommendations and that the pressure of
public opinion would eventually induce them to accept the findings
of a distinguished panel. But experience has proven that public
agencies also reject recommendations and that neither employers
nor employees are forced to agreement by critical editorials or public
dismay. In the famous sanitation strike in February of 1968, Mayor
Lindsay rejected as "blackmail" a panel's recommendation for an
additional increase of fifty cents a week and was widely praised for
this action. The fact is that either side can reject recommendations
with impunity, leaving open the question of how the dispute is then
to be settled. It is also true that when recommendations are rejected
by one side and accepted by the other, the dispute usually becomes
more difficult to settle. Positions become frozen, and the likelihood
of a serious impasse is increased. In the absence of any further procedures, the status quo prevails, usually to the union's disadvantage,
thus deepening the belief of labor organizations that the law is unfair
to them. In the traditional dispute over a wage increase, a union
objecting to the amount recommended is effectively without recourse, since it cannot strike. The result is the same where the union
accepts but the public employer rejects. To avoid such a situation,
unions are led to threaten a strike during negotiations in an effort
to solidify their bargaining position. It is doubtful that such threats
can be made illegal. In one instance, a union seeking to discount the
prospect of a strike nevertheless conveyed a threat when its president
answered affirmatively a reporter's question as to whether the union
intended to adhere to its traditional policy of no contract, no work.
This was a strike threat, but hardly grounds for a criminal proceeding.
15. This has occurred both in the recent strike by New York City sanitation workers in February 1968 and the November 1968 strike involving Consolidated Edison
employees.
16. N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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Where no agreement is reached by the deadline, it becomes difficult if not impossible for the union leader to avoid going over the
brink. Alternatively, the unions may resort to subterfuge methods
of achieving an effective bargaining posture by working to the rule,
feigning sickness, or even by engaging in a mass resignation. Perhaps
the most ingenious technique was the decision of a police group to
punish all traffic violators for even minor infractions. This effectively
reduced automobile accidents, but it also slowed traffic and distracted police officers from other more pressing assignments.
The Taylor Committee foresaw the difficulties arising when recommendations are rejected and proposed that such impasses be submitted to the appropriate legislative body for a final determination.17
But the New York State Legislature did not view favorably the prospect of having each labor dispute that reached an impasse submitted
to it for decision. Moreover, it is questionable whether the legislature
is an appropriate body to handle individual labor disputes. It is not
surprising, therefore, that the legislature dropped this proposal. As
a result, there was no means by which a dispute involving public employees in the State of New York could be resolved if the parties
themselves failed to agree. In two subsequent reports to Governor
Rockefeller, the Taylor Committee identified this lack of finality as
a major defect in the law, but it offered no new solution.18 Rather,
the Committee reaffirmed its proposal for legislative determination
to resolve impasses created when either party rejects recommendations. In its recent amendments to the Taylor Law, the New York
Legislature apparently accepted this proposal. 19
The Taylor Law has now been in effect for nearly two years.
It was subjected to great strain in its infancy. Not yet an adult chronologically, it has aged rapidly in experience and is now seasoned
enough to be judged. It has not met the harsh but significant test
17. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final
Report 56-57 (1966).
18. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York,
Interim Report Gune 17, 1968).
19. Under the amended law, final resolution of disputes is committed to the appropriate legislative body:
(iii) [T]he legislative body or a duly authorized committee thereof shall forthwith
conduct a hearing at which the parties shall be required to explain their positions
with respect to the report of the fact-finding board; and (iv) thereafter, the legislative body shall take such action as it deems to be in the public interest, including the interest of the public employees involved.
Law of March 4, 1969, § 209(3)(e), GERR, No. 288, F-1, F-5, amending N.Y. C1v. SERv.
LAW § 209(3)(e) (McKinney Supp. 1968).
For the proposal of the Taylor Committee, see Governor's Committee on Public
Employee Relations, State of New York, Second Interim Report 5 Gan. 23, 1969).
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by which such machinery must be evaluated: it has not prevented
strikes that imperil the public interest. In September 1967, the
teachers in New York City struck for fourteen days. 20 In the early
hours of 1968 a transit strike was narrowly averted after negotiations
under an implicit strike threat; in order to achieve settlement, the
procedures of the Taylor Act had to be temporarily set aside. 21 In
February 1968, the sanitation service of New York City was interrupted for nine days, leaving the city unsightly, unkempt, infested
with disease, plagued by the threat of fire, and seemingly helpless
to correct the situation. And in the fall of 1968 the city's schools
were closed for two months in a dispute that set new marks for bitterness and hostility, and raised spectres of racial and religious bias
that threaten to undermine the fabric of social order.22 Other important city workers, including policemen and firemen, have either
threatened strikes or resorted to some form of job action.
It would be unfair to place upon the legal machinery sole responsibility for these interruptions of critical services on which the
welfare of New York depends. But the fact remains that the machinery-including the prohibition on strikes with attendant penalties and the fact-finding boards with their power to make recommendations-did not work to settle these disputes or stop the strikes,
slowdowns, or threats. In fact it is probable that the Taylor Law
exacerbated these conflicts. For one thing, it made subversive a form
of conduct society endorses for private workers. It encouraged unions
to threaten to strike to achieve the bargaining position participants
in collective bargaining must possess. It made the march to jail a
martyr's procession and a badge of honor for union leaders. It hardened positions by calling upon representative organizations to declare publicly their acceptance or rejection of fact finders' recommendations. In simple point of fact, it did not and is not likely to
work as a mechanism for resolving conflicts in public employment
relations through joint determination, whether called collective bargaining or collective negotiations.
Now there is raised with increasing frequency the suggestion that
the proper technique for resolution of impasses in public employment relations is some third-party determination where an outsider
to the dispute is given ultimate authority to fix the terms of employ20. N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1967, at 1, col. 8.
21. N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1968, at 1, col. 3; id., Jan. 2, 1968, at 1, col. 2.
22. Mayer, The Full and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, the
Teachers' Union and the Teachers' Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6
(Magazine), at 18.
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ment. Most commonly this takes the form of a proposal for compulsory arbitration, but other procedures such as labor courts are also
mentioned. 23 The Taylor Committee rejected compulsory arbitration for two reasons. 24 First, the Committee thought that it was
probably an illegal delegation of the authority of a public agency.
Second, it felt that it would encourage disputants to resort constantly
to arbitration instead of themselves assuming the responsibility of
decision-making. But proposals for arbitration persist. Moreover,
they do succeed in framing the issue properly, for the question seems
to me to be whether there is a viable alternative to collective bargaining for the effective resolution of disputes in public employment,
and compulsory arbitration in one form or another is the only
logical, if not practical, alternative. It does provide, at least in theory,
for a "final" resolution of conflicts when an impasse is reached.
My concern here is with the proposals that arbitration should
become the common technique for settlement of disputes over the
terms of a new contract25-including issues of wages, other benefits,
and working conditions. This is not a precisely defined area. Increasingly the issues in dispute include questions of employee participation in determination of policy in the work place. This is
particularly true in highly skilled and professional categories.
Teachers, doctors, social workers-all naturally seek a greater voice
in the professional decisions affecting their work.26
There are in effect only three ways by which the terms of employment can be set in the public or private sector. First, they may be set
unilaterally, commonly by the employer. In private industry this is
still the case where the employees are not organized, but it is illegal
23. See generally Fleming, The Labor Court Idea, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1551 (1967).
24. Governor's Committee, supra note 17, at 67-68.
25. Disputes over the terms of a new contract should be clearly distinguished from
questions of "interpretation" or "application" of contracts already in force. In the
private sector, individual questions of interpretation or application are commonly
resolved through grievance procedures leading to voluntary arbitration. The inclusion
of these procedures in negotiated agreements is one of the great achievements of labormanagement relations in this country, for it assures the stability necessary for
economic planning and growth during the period of a contract. This practice stands
in marked contrast to that of other countries, such as England, where the threat of
wildcat or unofficial strikes is a constant impediment to economic growth and industrial efficiency. In the public sector, where contracts of employment are permitted
and where obstacles to arbitration of grievances have largely been overcome, the
union is generally able to obtain agreement from the public employer to arbitrate
questions of interpretation or application during the period of the contract.
26. See generally Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in
Public Education: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REv.
1033 (1969); Wallett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH.
L. REv. 1017 (1969).
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where unions have been chosen. Although modified by available
political appeals, this was the traditional method used in public employment for organized as well as unorganized workers. Second, the
. terms of employment may be set by joint determination through
collective bargaining. Joint talks can supply information and help
define the area of disagreement, but real bargaining to resolve those
issues depends on the ability of the negotiators effectively to say
"no" by suspending the relationship. That possibility exerts pressure
on both sides. It infuses the bargaining with the sense of urgency
that produces necessary accommodation of conflicting interests.
Third, a neutral third party may be designated the final decision
maker. This is the case in arbitration. The impartial adjudicator
hears both sides and makes a decision. Arbitration should not be confused with fact-finding, mediation, or any other form of third-party
procedure that does not result in a final decision. In arbitration, the
standard of determination can and should be the equity of the claim,
whereas in fact-finding with recommendations, the standard has to
be the acceptability of the recommendations. The arbitrator's decision is final. Since there is no appeal from the decision, the uncertainty may encourage voluntary agreement. Each party runs a
risk, so there may in fact be more incentive to agree than is the case
when a board makes recommendations which can be turned down.
But it also provides, as the Taylor Committee observed,27 an incentive for negotiators to pass the buck and then complain about the
result.
Several states have adopted statutes imposing arbitration in particular types of public employment disputes. In Minnesota, disputes
over "maximum hours and minimum wages" of employees in charitable non profit hospitals must be submitted to arbitration. 28 A
Nebraska statute governing public employee labor disputes provides
for arbitration at the request of either party.29 In Rhode Island two
statutes provide for arbitration of disputes involving teachers and
municipal employees, but the decision is binding only with respect
to matters not involving monetary expenditures.80 Under a recent
Pennsylvania statute,31 unresolved disputes involving uniformed
police and firemen must be arbitrated. In other disputes not imperiling public health or safety, a strike may lawfully take place.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Governor's Committee, supra note 17, at 67-68.
MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.36-.38 (1966).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-824 (1968).
R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-9, 28-9.4-10
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969).

(1969).
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This is a major departure from traditional thought about strikes by
public employees.
While arbitration can be a legal and feasible method of settling
disputes in certain situations, it is not in my opinion the panacea
for our problems. It does face serious legal obstacles. There are many
issues which are proper subjects of bargaining, but which no agency
of government can legally submit for decision to a third party. This
is evident, for example, in disputes involving teachers whose work
is directly affected by educational policy which school boards must
ultimately decide. Arbitration will be effective only if viewed as a
last resort after other steps have failed and the dispute has reached
a stage where the issues remaining unresolved have been sharply
narrowed and can be stated within specific bounds. Framing the
issues properly, and providing some standards for determination-if
only the limits of the arbitrator's authority-is essential if arbitration is to be of any use. The absence of standards of reference makes
arbitration of issues involving wages and other terms of a contract
fraught with difficulty. In the case of policy questions, arbitration
must be viewed as illegal and impractical except within narrowly
defined limits. When bargaining has framed the issue with precision,
then arbitration may be possible. Thus Congress first framed the
issue and then ordered arbitration in the national railroad dispute
of 1967. The question submitted was whether a proposal made by a
fact-finding panel should be modified.32 The burden was on the parties seeking a change to prove why it should be granted, and standards for such a determination were included in the special legislation. In these circumstances, the board of arbitration was able to
function because the outer limits of the award were effectively prescribed by the law imposing arbitration.
Other difficulties involved in using arbitration as the common
method of dispute settlement in situations where the issues are submitted without definition were revealed in my experience during a
police dispute as the first arbitrator appointed under the 1968 statute
in Pennsylvania.83 The dispute concerned the demand of police in
Pittsburgh for wage increases and other benefits, and the demand of
the city for a change in the disciplinary procedures for police which
the state legislature had set. The police and the city divided sharply
on two related questions concerning interpretation of the arbitration
statute. The first was whether the arbitration board should consider
32. 45 U.S.C. § 157 (Supp. 1968).
33. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 217 (Supp. 1969).
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the fiscal requirements of the city in making its decision and limit
the award to the existing revenue and taxing authority of the municipality. 84 The statute was silent. The police argued that the standard of determination should be "what is a policeman worth in
today's society." The city argued that the arbitrator should be guided
by the fiscal responsibilities and limitations of the deficit-ridden
municipal government. Without any guidelines, the arbitrator's
award could well have been grossly inadequate by comparison with
the policemen's legitimate needs, or it might have been grossly out
of line with the city's fiscal capacity.
The second question was the extent to which the statute imposed
an obligation on the state legislature to take action required to
effectuate the arbitrators' award. Here, the positions of the parties
seemed to reverse. The union argued that the arbitrators could not
compel a change in the law. The city said the state legislature was
bound by the decision and would have to enact whatever legislation
was necessary to effectuate the award. The statute was ambiguous.
But if it is read to grant the arbitrators authority to "bind" the legislature, the act might well be unconstitutional. On the other hand, if
the legislature has no obligation to provide the necessary funds, the
city could be crippled by an award with which it is bound to
comply. It would be forced either to impose taxes it opposes or to
cut other services not covered by the award. If the legislature does
not have to change the law on disciplinary procedures to comply
with an arbitration award, then the demand for a change is not
arbitrable in spite of what the law says. Either way it is an intolerable
dilemma. I declined the opportunity to resolve this question, which
properly belongs to the courts, but in issuing my award on wages
I made clear my feeling that the legislature had some obligationalbeit not necessarily legal or enforceable-to provide the city the
resources it needed to comply with the award without reducing
essential services. But the more fundamental issues remained unsettled, and remain today the subject of debate throughout Pennsylvania. The simple lesson is that compulsory arbitration for all
disputes and all issues is neither legally sound nor practically feasible. It would be a great mistake to adopt this procedure as the
usual method prescribed in advance for all disputes in the expectation that it would signal an end to labor strife in public employment.
I believe, rather, that we should acknowledge the failure of
34. See generally Rehmus, Constraints on Local Governments and Public Employee
Bargaining, 67 MICH. L. REv. 919 (1969).
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unilateral determination, and turn instead to true collective bargaining, even though this must include the possibility of a strike.
vVe would then clearly understand that we must seek to improve the
bargaining process and the skill of the negotiators to prevent strikes.
For in the end, the solution to the wide range of labor problems involving the many aspects of a dynamic and complicated human relationship must depend on the human factor. The most elaborate
machinery is no better than the people who man it. It cannot function automatically. With skillful and responsible negotiators, no
machinery, no outsiders, and no fixed rules are needed to settle disputes. For too long our attention has been directed to the mechanics
and penalties rather than to the participants and the process. It is
now time to change that, to seek to prevent strikes by encouraging
collective bargaining to the fullest extent possible.
For the few strikes that might jeopardize public health or safety,
I would favor legislation authorizing the governor of a state to seek
an injunction for a specified period through procedures similar to
those for emergency disputes under the Taft-Hartley Act.35 During
the cooling-off period, the parties could continue their search for
the basis of accommodation to end the dispute. If these procedures
prove unavailing, then the legislature could consider means, but not
the specific terms, of settlement, including the possibility of submitting the remaining issues to arbitration within specified bounds.
In a particular situation, with issues sharply limited and defined
through bargaining, arbitration imposed as a last resort by the legislature can effectively protect the public interest without making a
sham of the bargaining process. Our primary reliance would then
be placed, as I believe it must if we are to prevent strikes, on joint
determination by parties in a true bargaining atmosphere.
I suggest, in short, that there is no workable substitute for collective bargaining-even in government-and that our best chance
to prevent strikes against the public interest lies in improving the
practice of bargaining. In an environment conducive to real bargaining, strikes will be fewer and shorter than in a system where employees are in effect invited to defy the law in order to make real the
promise of joint determination. In a real bargaining environment,
the employee representatives, I am convinced, can more effectively
meet their dual responsibility to negotiate and to lead. Only if
leaders do both can there be constructive labor relationships in place
85. 29

u.s.c. §§

176-80 (1964).
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of the chaos resulting when agreements reached in negotiations are
rejected by an angry rank and file or defied by subterfuge forms of
strikes such as working to the rule.
My suggestions are not put forth with a guaranty that they will
bring a complete end to public employee srtikes. They will not.
Rather I suggest that reliance on legal prohibitions, penalties, and
elaborate third-party recommendations has not worked, and that
before we turn in desperation to compulsory third-party determination, which cannot serve as a steady diet, we should give bargaining
in the public sector the same opportunity it has received, with beneficial results, in the private sector. The most effective technique to
produce acceptable terms to resolve disputes is voluntary agreement
of the parties, and the best system we have for producing agreements
between groups is collective bargaining-even though it involves
conflict and the possibility of a work disruption. There is no alternative.

